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Abstract
A key ingredient of many popular asset pricing models is that investors exhibit
countercyclical risk aversion, which helps explain major economic puzzles such
as the strong and systematic variation in risk premiums over time and the high
volatility of asset prices. There is, however, surprisingly little evidence for this
assumption because it is diﬃcult to control for the host of factors that change
simultaneously during ﬁnancial booms and busts. We circumvent these control
problems by priming ﬁnancial professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario
and by subsequently measuring their risk aversion in two experimental investment
tasks with real monetary stakes. Subjects who were primed with a ﬁnancial bust
were substantially more risk averse than those who were primed with a boom.
Subjects were also more fearful in the bust than in the boom condition, and their
fear is negatively related to investments in the risky asset, suggesting that fear may
play an important role in countercyclical risk aversion. The mechanism described
in this paper is relevant for theory and has important implications, as it provides
the basis for a self-reinforcing process that ampliﬁes market dynamics.
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1 Introduction
One of the major puzzles in ﬁnancial economics is the fact that risk premiums of many
asset classes vary strongly and systematically over time. In particular, the equity risk
premium seems to be higher during recessions than in business cycle peaks. Over the
past decades a high price-dividend ratio of U.S. stocks preceded several years of low
returns and vice versa (Shiller 1981; Campbell and Shiller 1988a,b; Cochrane 2011).
To account for this pervasive pattern, asset pricing models have evolved that assume
that investors exhibit countercyclical risk aversion. In these models, investors are less
risk averse during ﬁnancial booms compared to busts. Investors in consumption-based
asset pricing models derive utility from consumption relative to a habit or subsistence
level of consumption (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999) and become more risk averse
as asset prices decline and consumption approaches the habit level. In the model of
Barberis et al. (2001), utility depends not only on consumption, but also on recent
investment performance relative to some historical benchmark. They assume that future
losses are psychologically more painful if recent investments yielded a relatively poor
performance. As Mehra (2012) recently pointed out, however, the question whether
investors actually exhibit countercyclical risk aversion as postulated in these models
remains open. We address this gap in empirical knowledge by providing evidence in
favor of countercyclical risk aversion.1 Our evidence is based on the risk taking behavior
of ﬁnancial market professionals in a controlled experimental environment that provides
a measure of subjects’ risk aversion.
In view of the diﬃculties in identifying countercyclical risk aversion, it is not sur-
prising that only limited evidence exists to date. A key issue is ﬁnding ceteris paribus
variation in ﬁnancial market trends. Using actual market data can be problematic be-
1We deﬁne countercyclical risk aversion as a lower willingness to buy identical risky assets (i.e., assets
with an identical price, identical objective asset returns and identical subjective expectation about these
asset returns) in a bust relative to a boom. Subjects who behave in this way apply a higher risk discount
to the same assets (i.e., they exhibit higher risk aversion) in the bust compared to the boom treatment.
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cause behavior in booms and busts is simultaneously aﬀected by many factors that are
often diﬃcult to measure. For example, a decline in asset prices is generally associated
with changes in subjective expected asset returns, asset price volatility, overall ﬁnancial
wealth, changes in habits, and background risks that may or may not be correlated with
asset prices (Calvet and Sodini 2014; Beaud and Willinger forthcoming). This makes
inferring risk aversion from actual asset holdings extremely challenging. For example, in
the absence of good expectations data, holding a low share of risky assets may reﬂect
investors’ high risk aversion or their pessimistic expectations for future returns (e.g., Mal-
mendier and Nagel 2011). In addition, there is evidence suggesting that inertia governs
household asset allocation, i.e., households re-balance their portfolios only slowly in re-
sponse to capital gains and losses, implying that their portfolio contains too many or too
few risky assets for a given level of risk aversion (e.g., Agnew et al. 2003; Brunnermeier
and Nagel 2008).
We circumvent these measurement and identiﬁcation problems in this paper by di-
rectly measuring the willingness to take ﬁnancial risks in a controlled task - adapted from
Gneezy and Potters (1997) - with real ﬁnancial stakes: subjects received an initial en-
dowment of 200 Swiss francs (about 220 USD) and decided how much to invest in a risky
asset with a positive expected return, and how much to put on a risk-free account with
a zero interest rate. Our subjects are ﬁnancial professionals who trade assets privately
and professionally. One of our investment tasks serves as a measurement tool for risk
aversion - the risk task - where we have perfect control over subjects’ expected returns
and the risks they face because we determine (and subjects know) the probabilities and
payoﬀs in the task. In contrast, in the other investment task - the ambiguity task -
subjects do not know the precise probabilities, but we control for their expectations by
explicitly measuring them.
Instead of measuring subjects’ risk taking in a real ﬁnancial boom and bust, which
is associated with all the measurement and identiﬁcation problems mentioned above,
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we primed half of the subjects with a stock market boom and the other half with a
stock market bust. We primed subjects by asking them to ﬁll out a survey before they
participated in the investment tasks and they were shown a ﬁctive graph of asset prices
in one part of the survey that resembled a stock market boom or a bust, respectively.
We then asked them group-speciﬁc general questions about their investment strategy
during either a boom or a bust, depending on which group they were in. In this way, we
mentally activated the concept of a ﬁnancial boom or bust, i.e., we rendered it mentally
salient.
Priming is a well-established and frequently used method in psychology and refers
to the mental activation of the primed concepts (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). In re-
cent years, priming has also been increasingly used in economics and ﬁnance.2 Priming
enables the measurement of the pure psychological impact of the primed concepts on
behavior (and emotions and cognition) in subsequent tasks. This technique allows us to
measure the psychological impact of booms and busts on risk preferences without the
confounding inﬂuence of background risk, wealth eﬀects, changing habits, experienced
gains or losses, unknown returns, and volatility expectations, because all these variables
remain unchanged across conditions. In other words, subjects in the boom and bust
condition face exactly identical choice problems, and random assignment to conditions
ensures that the two treatment groups are statistically identical. Thus, any behavioral
diﬀerence in average risk taking across conditions identiﬁes the psychological impact of
boom versus bust on subjects’ risk preferences.
Our results show that ﬁnancial professionals take substantially fewer risks when they
are primed with a ﬁnancial bust as opposed to a boom. When the probabilities with
which diﬀerent payoﬀs arose are perfectly known (risk task), they invest on average 22
percent less into the risky asset in the bust condition (45 percent of the endowment)
2For example, Gilad and Kliger (2008) primed ﬁnancial professionals using a ﬁctive story about a
person gambling in the casino. See also Benjamin et al. (2010) and Callen et al. (2014) for recent priming
studies examining the respective inﬂuence of social identity or violent trauma on risk taking.
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than in the boom condition (58 percent of the endowment). When subjects do not have
perfect information about probabilities (ambiguity task), we observe a similar 17 percent
reduction in the amount allocated to the risky asset in the bust treatment. Because the
priming could, in principle, also aﬀect subjects’ expectations about the probability of
the good state of the world in the ambiguity task, we also measured these expectations.
However, the priming did not aﬀect expectations. We thus unambiguously observe a
countercyclical willingness to take risks, i.e., priming subjects with a bust condition
increases their risk aversion relative to the boom prime.3
In view of previous studies (e.g., List and Haigh 2005; Cipriani and Guarino 2009)
suggesting that psychological forces are attenuated in more experienced market par-
ticipants, we further examined whether participants with less market experience drive
the priming eﬀect. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between subjects with
diﬀerent market experience. If anything, market experience tends to increase the suscep-
tibility to booms and busts.4 Further analysis suggests that the speciﬁc emotion of fear
may play a critical role in countercyclical risk aversion. Subjects in the bust condition
exhibited a signiﬁcantly higher level of fear than those in the boom condition. We also
ﬁnd that higher levels of fear predict a signiﬁcantly lower investment in the risky asset.
The idea that fear may be related to risk taking has been recognized previously in the
psychological literature. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found in a correlation
study that more fearful individuals are less willing to take risks in a hypothetical choice
situation (i.e., in the Asian disease problem). However, evidence for a causal relation-
ship between fear and risk preferences when decisions have real monetary consequences
remains scarce.5 In order to study the causal impact of fear on ﬁnancial risk taking, we
3The prime could also aﬀect subjects’ ambiguity aversion in the ambiguity task. However, as an
increase in ambiguity aversion also represents a reduction in the willingness to invest in the risky asset,
we use the term risk aversion for both for convenience.
4In a similar vein, Haigh and List (2005) ﬁnd that professional traders exhibit more myopic loss
aversion than students.
5See, for example, Lee and Andrade (2011) and Lin et al. (2012). In these papers fear is induced
exogenously in a market setting where it can aﬀect both subjects’ risk preferences and their beliefs
about others behavior. Thus, if fear induces behavioral changes, this can be due to changes in subjects’
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conducted a further experiment in which we exposed experimental subjects to fear from
random electric shocks during an investment task. All subjects faced low and high fear
trials, enabling us to control for individual diﬀerences in risk taking and fear perception.
A high (low) fear level was implemented by informing subjects that they would receive
painful (mild and painless) random electric shocks during the next three investment
trials.6 When participants were exposed to low levels of fear, they were willing to take
signiﬁcantly higher risks than when they were subject to high levels of fear. Interestingly,
not the actual shock itself but the expectation of receiving a painful shock during the
task diminished risk taking in this study. Taken together, the combined evidence from
the priming and the fear induction experiment thus suggests that the emotion of fear
may play an important role in countercyclical risk aversion.
Our ﬁndings contribute to several strands of the literature. Most importantly, we
provide direct support for countercyclical risk aversion, which is a key ingredient of asset
pricing models that aim to explain the high volatility of asset prices and the counter-
cyclical risk premium for equity (Campbell and Cochrane 1999; Barberis et al. 2001).7
Higher risk aversion during a bust directly implies that households demand a high equity
risk premium, while the required risk premium is lower during a boom. In addition, our
ﬁndings provide a rationale for self-reinforcing feedback loops that amplify market dy-
namics and generate excess volatility. For example, a decline in stock prices could evoke
feelings of fear among investors, rendering them more risk averse. This may lead to the
sale of stocks (i.e., panic sales), which then creates additional downward momentum for
the prices. Likewise, a stock market boom could be ampliﬁed through a reduction in
risk preferences or changes in their expectations about other market participants’ behavior.
6We also measured ex-ante each subject’s individual pain threshold in order to be able to calibrate
painless and painful electric shocks for each individual.
7There have been several attempts in the literature to validate the consumption based habit model by
testing one particular prediction of the model. In this model, habits imply that lower wealth is associated
with higher risk aversion. Existing studies produced mixed evidence (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008;
Calvet et al. 2009; Chiappori and Paiella 2011). These studies typically rely on the assumption that
risky asset holdings are a good proxy of risk aversion, making it necessary to control for many other
factors for which good proxies may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
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fear and risk aversion.
The fact that booms and busts aﬀect subjects’ fear diﬀerently and that fear may di-
rectly aﬀect their risk preferences has potentially intriguing implications for how economists
should model the individual. In standard theory, expectations typically do not aﬀect pref-
erences. If, however, price expectations aﬀect fear levels, they may also directly aﬀect
risk preferences. In this context, we would like to emphasize that nothing in our ﬁndings
rules out that expectations may also have a direct amplifying eﬀect on market dynamics.
If, for example, a substantial share of traders has optimistic price expectations during a
boom, this may not only increase their investments in risky assets through a decrease in
risk aversion but also because they expect higher returns.8
Our evidence for time varying risk aversion may also have implications that go beyond
providing an explanation for countercyclical risk premiums and excess volatility in asset
prices. Cochrane (2011) pointed out that time varying risk premiums have implications
for ﬁnance applications, accounting, cost of capital, capital structure, compensation, and
macroeconomics.9
Our study is also related to an interesting paper by Guiso et al. (2013) who examined
time varying risk aversion. They administered a questionnaire to customers of an Italian
bank before the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007 and after the crisis in 2009. They ﬁnd that cus-
tomers reported a lower certainty equivalent for a hypothetical lottery following the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis. Due to the fact that many variables (e.g., wealth, expectations of returns
and volatility, experienced losses and gains, etc.) could have changed simultaneously be-
tween 2007 and 2009, the authors face the diﬃcult task of controlling for them by ﬁnding
appropriate proxies. Our study diﬀers from theirs by randomly assigning ﬁnancial pro-
8The ﬁndings in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) suggest that historical experiences may also play a
role in investment behavior. They show that individuals which experienced low stock returns in their
early lives report more pessimistic expectations of future returns and exhibit a lower willingness to take
risks even after decades. See Dillenberger and Rozen (2014) for a formal model of history-dependent
risk taking behavior.
9Cochrane (2011) uses the term time varying discount rate which includes time discounting and the
discounting of the value of risky assets because of risk aversion. In this view, time varying risk aversion
is a key cause of time varying discount rates.
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fessionals to a boom or bust condition. While our priming approach ensures that there
are no observable or unobservable diﬀerences between the subjects in the two conditions,
it also comes with the potential drawback that behavior and emotions are not measured
during an actual boom and bust. Instead, we merely rendered the state of a boom or a
bust salient in subjects’ minds. However, actual booms and busts are likely to constitute
much more powerful primes (i.e., they are emotionally more salient). It seems therefore
plausible that the inﬂuence of real booms and busts may be even stronger. Our study
further diﬀers from Guiso et al. (2013) because we measure risk aversion in an incentive
compatible way, i.e., subjects’ decisions implied sizable ﬁnancial consequences for them.
We are aware of the concern that the size of preference parameters estimated in labo-
ratory experiments cannot be extrapolated to ﬁeld settings without caveats (Harrison
et al. 2007; Charness et al. 2013). However, because we are interested in the comparative
static eﬀects of booms versus busts rather than the absolute levels of risk aversion, we
feel conﬁdent that our results are generalizable to ﬁeld settings.10 Finally, a notable
feature of our experiment is that, unlike in most laboratory experiments, we analyze the
behavior of ﬁnancial professionals who actively participate in ﬁnancial markets. Overall,
it is reassuring that both studies, Guiso et al. (2013) and ours, arrive at the same con-
clusion: the subjective willingness to take risks is lower during a recession. The fact that
this conclusion emerges from diﬀerent studies with diﬀerent research designs, subject
pools, and methods strengthens the evidence for countercyclical risk aversion.
Finally, our study is also related to the small but growing literature on the eﬀects of
emotional or traumatic events on risk taking and other economic behaviors (e.g., Saun-
ders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Knutson et al. 2008; Kuhnen and Knutson
2011; Lin et al. 2012; Bassi et al. 2013; Cameron and Shah 2013; Callen et al. 2014).
This literature generally suggests that emotional and/or traumatic events can have con-
10Many studies found signiﬁcant correlations between lottery choices and ﬁeld behavior, including
health-related behaviors (Anderson and Mellor 2008; Sutter et al. 2013), career choices (Masclet et al.
2009; Bellemare and Shearer 2010), and ﬁnancial decisions (Dohmen et al. 2011; Guiso et al. 2013;
Vieider et al. forthcoming).
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siderable eﬀects on preferences and behavior. Although these studies suggest that emo-
tionally signiﬁcant events can aﬀect preferences, none of them examines countercyclical
risk aversion, i.e., how booms and busts aﬀect risk preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimen-
tal design. Section 3 describes the sample and presents a randomization check. Section
4 summarizes the empirical ﬁndings, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted the experiment at a large ﬁnancial trade fair where exhibitors presented
their ﬁnancial products and services. We installed a mobile laboratory in a quiet corner
of the fairground, ensuring that the experiment was run under controlled conditions. To
investigate the behavior of real ﬁnancial market participants, we recruited our subjects
on the day when the trade fair was only open to ﬁnancial professionals. Subjects were
asked to ﬁll out a short computerized ﬁnancial market survey in which they could earn
money.11 The computer stations were separated by partition walls to guarantee privacy
(see Figure A1 in the appendix).
The ﬁrst part of the survey contained a few icebreaker questions. The second part
comprised our key experimental manipulation. The computer randomly assigned sub-
jects to one of two treatments. In treatment “Boom”, subjects ﬁrst saw an animated,
ﬁctive chart of a booming stock market (see left panel of Figure 1). They subsequently
answered ﬁve questions about their investment strategy during a stock market boom
(e.g., “Imagine you ﬁnd yourself in a continuing stock market boom and you expect the
development to continue as indicated by the arrow in the picture. Would you buy or sell
particular stocks? Explain your answer brieﬂy.”). In treatment “Bust”, subjects faced the
opposite situation, i.e., a stock market bust (see right panel of Figure 1), and answered
an analogous set of questions about their investment behavior during a bust. Following
11The instructions for the investment task and the survey are available upon request.
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these questions, subjects reported their current emotional state. We elicited their gen-
eral aﬀective state and fear as a more speciﬁc emotion. General aﬀect was elicited with
a widely used and validated non-verbal measure, where subjects have to select one out
of nine manikins (see online appendix) which best expresses their current aﬀective state
ranging from very negative (encoded as “-4”) to very positive (encoded as “4”) (Bradley
and Lang 1994). Fear was measured by asking subjects to report the intensity of fear on
a 7-point Likert scale (Bosman and Van Winden 2002).12
Figure 1: Boom and Bust treatment
(a) Treatment Boom (b) Treatment Bust
These animated charts were used to increase the mental saliency of ﬁnancial booms and busts. We
deliberately did not label the time and price axes to prevent subjects from thinking about a speciﬁc
stock market event, but about booms and busts in general. The orange arrows were used to illustrate
that the market trends were not expected to revert in the near future.
Subjects could subsequently earn up to 500 Swiss francs (or 546 US dollars at the
time of the experiment) in an investment task (adapted from Gneezy and Potters 1997).
They were endowed with 200 Swiss francs and decided how much to invest in a risky
asset. If the good state of the world occurred, subjects won two and a half times the
12Self-reported emotional experiences have been shown to be consistently correlated with diﬀerent
physiological measures such as heart rate and facial muscle contraction (Bradley and Lang 2000).
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invested amount. If the bad state occurred, subjects lost the invested amount. The
remaining amount that was not invested in the risky asset was automatically credited to
a safe account with a zero interest rate. We implemented two variants of the investment
task, which diﬀered only by the extent to which subjects knew the probability of success
for the risky asset. In the risk task, subjects knew the probability of success. They
saw a picture of a plastic box on their computer screens which contained one red and
one yellow ball (see left panel of Figure A2 in the appendix). The real box was visibly
placed on the instructor’s table and used to determine whether the good or the bad state
occurred for each subject. At the end of the experiment, the instructor drew one of the
two balls blindly. If the yellow ball was drawn, the good state occurred, i.e., the risky
investment was successful. In the ambiguity task, the probability of success for the risky
asset was uncertain for the subjects. We introduced uncertainty using a second plastic
box ﬁlled with a large, unknown number of blue, red, and yellow balls (see right panel
of Figure A2 in the appendix). Analogous to the risk task, the good state occurred if a
yellow ball was drawn at the end of the experiment. We set the share of yellow balls at
50 percent, i.e., at the same level as in the risk task. After the ambiguity task, subjects
guessed the share of yellow balls, which provides a measure of their expectations.
The ﬁnal part of the survey included a question on general optimism borrowed from
the standard Life Orientation Test, a commonly used test in psychology (Scheier et al.
1994). Subjects indicated the extent to which they agreed with the statement “Overall,
I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.” on a 7-point Likert scale. We
used this question as a second, more general measure of expectations. Subjects next
completed a ﬁnancial literacy test. We created our own test because existing ﬁnancial
literacy tests were primarily developed for the general population (e.g., van Rooij et al.
2011). Our ﬁnancial literacy test is a multiple choice test and asked subjects to rank
order diﬀerent ﬁnancial products according to their volatility, identify the advantages of
traded funds, select the correct term for purchasing a put option, and ﬁnally, to recognize
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which companies are currently listed on the Swiss Market Index. The survey concluded
with questions collecting information on subjects’ socio-economic backgrounds.
Several features of the experimental design are noteworthy. First, the risk task, where
subjects knew the exact probability of success, was always presented after the ambiguity
task. This prevented them from using the probability of success in the risk task as an
anchor for their decisions in the ambiguity task (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
Second, it was common knowledge that only one of the two investment decisions would
become payoﬀ relevant. The instructor drew a ball from the small or the large box
for each subject. Which box was used was determined randomly by the computer at
the end of the survey. This prevented subjects from pursuing hedging strategies across
decisions (e.g., Blanco et al. 2010). Finally, due to budget constraints, we randomly
selected 20 percent of the subjects for actual payment at the end of the survey.13 The
payment modality was common knowledge. Considering that the survey took only about
15 minutes to complete, the stake size was nevertheless quite sizable.
3 Descriptive statistics and randomization check
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A1 presents the summary statistics of our sample consisting of 162 ﬁnancial profes-
sionals. Their average age was 36.4 years. 75 percent were male. Their average monthly
income was 11’041 Swiss francs, which is representative for Switzerland’s ﬁnancial in-
dustry (Oﬃce 2010). 54 percent of the participants owned liquid assets worth 100’000
Swiss francs or more. Many worked as ﬁnancial advisors, but the sample also covers
other typical professional functions in the ﬁnancial industry, such as traders, analysts,
13Payment schemes with random components are commonly used in experiments on individual
decision-making and there is solid evidence showing that these schemes do not change behavior (Starmer
and Sugden 1991; Cubitt et al. 1998; Hey and Lee 2005).
11
and product managers.14 More than half of the participants indicated that they trade
assets at least once per month. We ﬁnd individual heterogeneity in ﬁnancial literacy,
but overall, the level of ﬁnancial knowledge was rather high. 64 percent correctly solved
three or all four problems in the ﬁnancial literacy test, while only 11 percent ended up
with a score of one or zero. This heterogeneity in ﬁnancial literacy is related to market
participation: subjects who reported trading assets frequently achieved a higher test
score compared to those who indicated they were less active in ﬁnancial markets (p =
0.013, t-test).15
3.2 Randomization check
We tested whether the computerized randomization successfully resulted in a balanced
sample using rank-sum tests, or 2-tests in case of binary variables. With the exception
of male subjects being slightly over-represented in treatment Boom (p = 0.069, 2-test),
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the socio-economic and ﬁnancial background
of the subjects is balanced between treatments based on conventional signiﬁcance levels
(see Table A1 in the appendix). We always control for gender in our regression analysis.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Investment decisions
Figure 2 displays the average investment share in the risky asset by treatment. In
both variants of the investment task, subjects made considerably more conservative
investment decisions in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom. Panel A presents
the treatment eﬀect in the risk task. Investments into the risky asset decreased on average
by 22 percent from an investment share of 57.7 percent in treatment Boom down to 45.2
14The job function question was asked in open format and therefore does not permit a precise classi-
ﬁcation of professional functions in some cases.
15We report two-sided p-values throughout the entire paper.
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percent in treatment Bust. The treatment eﬀect is similar in the ambiguity task, as
shown in Panel B. The share invested in the risky asset is on average 50.3 percent in
treatment Boom compared to 41.9 percent in treatment Bust, which corresponds to a
17 percent reduction in risk taking.
Figure 2: Booms, busts and investment decisions
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The ﬁgure shows average investments in the risk task (Panel A), and the ambiguity task (Panel B), by
treatments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
In order to underpin the treatment diﬀerences statistically and to control for individ-
ual diﬀerences in socio-economic and ﬁnancial background, we conducted a regression
analysis. Our regression model is speciﬁed as follows:
yik = 0 + 1Bustik + 2Ambiguityi + 3Xi + ik; (1)
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where the dependent variable yik is the share individual i invested in the risky asset
(in percent of the endowment) in investment task k. Bustik is a dummy for treatment
Bust, and Ambiguityi is a dummy for decisions made in the ambiguity task. We estimate
an alternative model where we include the interaction term Bustik  Ambiguityi. This
allows us to examine whether treatment Bust had a diﬀerential impact on investments in
the two variants of the task. Xi is the set of control variables for subjects’ socio-economic
and ﬁnancial backgrounds. We control for age, gender, ﬁnancial literacy, and trading
frequency.16 Finally, ik is the idiosyncratic error term. We estimate our regression
model using OLS and correct the standard errors for clustering at the individual level.
The results are the same if we use a Tobit model instead.
The estimation results reported in Table 1 corroborate our main ﬁnding. Column
(1) reveals that investments are signiﬁcantly lower in treatment Bust than in treatment
Boom (p = 0.020, t-test). This diﬀerence also holds if we include the interaction term
between treatment Bust and the ambiguity task, as shown in column (2). According
to this model, in the risk task, subjects invested on average 12 percentage point less
in the risky asset in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom (p = 0.012, t-test).
The interaction term between treatment Bust and the ambiguity task is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (p = 0.368, t-test). This means that we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the treatment eﬀect is similar in both variants of the task. We further ﬁnd
that subjects invested signiﬁcantly less in the risky asset when its success probability
was uncertain (p = 0.018 in column (1) and p = 0.012 in column (2), t-tests). This is
consistent with the notion that ambiguous prospects are valued less because of ambiguity
aversion.17 The control variables for ﬁnancial knowledge and trading frequency have no
16Due to item non-response, we do not use the income and wealth measures as control variables in the
regression analysis. Both measures are uncorrelated with risk taking and the results are qualitatively
the same if we include these variables.
17Reduced risk taking in the ambiguity task (i.e., ambiguity aversion) could be due to pessimistic
expectations or to an aversion to ambiguous success probabilities. Subjects guessed that the share of
winning balls in the ambiguous lottery is 43.3 percent on average (95% conﬁdence interval: [41.2%,
45.4%]). Thus, they were more pessimistic in the ambiguity task than in the risk task where they
knew they would win with a probability of 50 percent. We ran an additional regression where the
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signiﬁcant correlation with investment decisions.18
Table 1: Regression analysis of investment decisions
Dependent variable: Share invested in risky asset
(1) (2)
Bust -9.827** -11.879**
(4.177) (4.699)
Bust  Ambiguity 4.106
(4.544)
Ambiguity -5.407** -7.359**
(2.255) (2.891)
Age -0.080 -0.080
(0.188) (0.188)
Male 5.181 5.181
(4.153) (4.160)
Financial literacy 0.660 0.660
(2.470) (2.474)
High trading frequency -1.766 -1.766
(4.439) (4.446)
Constant 54.585*** 55.561***
(8.676) (8.706)
N 324 324
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the
individual level in parentheses). The dependent variable is the share invested in the risky asset (in
percent of the endowment). “Bust” is a dummy for treatment Bust. “Ambiguity” is a dummy indicating
decisions from the ambiguity task. The interaction term “Bust  Ambiguity” allows the treatment
eﬀect to diﬀer across the two variants of the investment task. “Age” is the individual’s age in years, and
“Male” is a gender dummy. “Financial literacy” is the score on the ﬁnancial literacy test, ranging from
0 to 4. “High trading frequency” is a dummy for individuals who trade assets at least once per month.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Given that some studies (e.g., List and Haigh 2005; Cipriani and Guarino 2009) report
that market experience diminishes the importance of psychological forces in ﬁnancial
decisions, we further examined whether the observed change in risk aversion is stronger in
within-subject diﬀerence of the investment share between the risk and the ambiguity task is regressed
on subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery (and other control variables).
We ﬁnd a negative yet insigniﬁcant (p = 0.238, t-test) correlation between investment diﬀerences across
risk and ambiguity task and the expected number of winning balls in the ambiguity task. This suggests
that while pessimistic expectations in the ambiguity task may have lowered investments in this task, an
aversion to ambiguous success probabilities may also have played a role.
18We also ﬁnd that male participants tended to invest more than their female counterparts, but not
signiﬁcantly so (p = 0.214 in column (1) and p = 0.215 in column (2), t-tests).
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subjects with less market experience. We used subjects’ ﬁnancial knowledge and trading
frequency as a proxy for their market experience. Panel A of Figure 3 presents average
investments in the risk task by treatment and level of ﬁnancial literacy. We divided the
sample into two equally sized groups: subjects with below-median ﬁnancial literacy and
those above-median. The picture shows that both groups responded similarly to our
manipulation. If anything, the treatment eﬀect seems to be even slightly stronger in
Figure 3: The role of market experience
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bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
subjects who scored higher on the ﬁnancial literacy test. We make a similar comparison
based on trading frequency in Panel B of Figure 3. We divided the sample into two
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groups of roughly the same size: subjects who trade assets at least on a monthly basis
and those who trade assets less frequently. The more active market participants exhibited
a slightly more pronounced reaction, but the diﬀerence is again not very large. A similar
pattern emerges in the ambiguity task (see Figure A3 in the appendix). We also ran
OLS regressions based on model (1), where we additionally include an interaction term
between the priming condition and ﬁnancial literacy, respectively trading frequency. The
estimation results indicate that market experience tends to enhance the treatment eﬀect,
but none of the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms reaches statistical signiﬁcance.19
4.2 Expectations
In addition to risk aversion, expectations may be another important determinant of
peoples’ risk taking behavior. We designed the risk task in such a way that expectations
should not matter. Subjects knew all parameters of this task, which eliminated any
kind of uncertainty. In contrast, the ambiguity task involved some uncertainty because
subjects did not know the share of winning balls. This enables us to study the role of
expectations in an environment that is comparable to the risk task.
The fact that we ﬁnd a similar eﬀect in both variants of the investment task is a pre-
liminary indication of a change in risk preferences, rather than a change in expectations.
If the mental saliency of booms and busts had an impact on subjective expectations, we
should observe a stronger treatment eﬀect in the ambiguity task because the absence of
perfect certainty about the share of winning balls leaves more room for expectations to
play a role in that task (e.g., Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005).
In order to directly test whether our manipulation aﬀected expectations, we esti-
mated an OLS regression model in which we regressed the subjects’ guessed share of
winning balls in the ambiguity task on a dummy for treatment Bust, and our set of
control variables. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that while subjects were slightly more
19The t-statistics and p-values for trading frequency are t = -1.02, p = 0.310 and t = -0.01, p = 0.989
for ﬁnancial literacy. The interaction term “Bust  Ambiguity” was excluded from the regression model.
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pessimistic concerning the probability of success in treatment Bust than in treatment
Boom, the diﬀerence is rather small and statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.209, t-test).
We additionally considered the subjects’ general levels of optimism as an alternative
Table 2: Regression analysis of expectations
Dependent variable: Guessed probability of success General optimism
(1) (2)
Bust -2.777 0.216
(2.203) (0.229)
Age 0.178* 0.004
(0.091) (0.011)
Male -1.505 -0.022
(2.830) (0.286)
Financial literacy 1.299 0.215*
(1.564) (0.122)
High trading frequency -1.101 -0.029
(2.183) (0.233)
Constant 36.414*** 3.548***
(5.440) (0.569)
N 162 162
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). In column (1),
the dependent variable is the guessed percentage of winning balls in the ambiguity task. In column
(2), the dependent variable is the degree of agreement to the statement “Overall, I expect more good
things to happen to me than bad.”, which ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
“Bust” is a dummy for treatment Bust. “Age” is the individual’s age in years, and “Male” is a gender
dummy. “Financial literacy” is the score on the ﬁnancial literacy test, ranging from 0 to 4. “High trading
frequency” is a dummy for individuals who trade assets at least on a biweekly basis. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
measure of expectations. The results in column 2 show that subjects were slightly more
optimistic in treatment Bust than in treatment Boom, although the coeﬃcient is small
and statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.346, t-test).20 Thus, regardless of which measure of
expectations one refers to, the ﬁndings support the key result that increasing the mental
saliency of booms and busts causes a change in risk aversion rather than a change in
20We also asked subjects whether they believed the Swiss Market Index (SMI) would tend to rise or
fall in the following two years and whether they thought they would lose their jobs within the next six
months. Our conclusion that the mental saliency of booms and busts did not inﬂuence expectations
remains the same if we use these alternative measures instead.
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the expectation of a successful outcome from the investment. The reduced willingness
to invest in the risky asset in the bust treatment indicates an increase in risk aversion,
i.e., a lower valuation of the risky asset for given subjective expectations about the state
of the world (the share of winning balls).
4.3 Emotions
Our ﬁnal piece of evidence sheds light on the possible mechanism underlying counter-
cyclical risk aversion. Most economic theories do not explicitly model emotions such
as fear. However, this does not mean that these theories are necessarily inconsistent
with emotion-driven mechanisms. For example, the mechanism underlying countercycli-
cal risk aversion in Barberis et al. (2001) can be easily reconciled with the notion of
fear. In this theory, investors have a mental cushion that regulates their psychological
capacity to deal with investment losses. A decline in asset prices reduces this mental
cushion and renders investors more fearful, which translates into a higher degree of risk
aversion. Likewise, the theory of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is, in principle, also
consistent with a fear based explanation. In this theory, individuals’ increase in risk
aversion after a fall in ﬁnancial wealth may arise because they fear being unable to
maintain their habitual level of consumption. The association of risk taking with fear
is also in accordance with recent brain imaging and hormone studies, which suggest a
link between a key fear processing unit of the brain (i.e., the amygdala) and risk taking
(e.g., Bossaerts 2009).21 Moreover, studies with professional traders indicate that even
highly trained market participants exhibit strong psychophysiological reactions typically
associated with strong emotions (e.g., variations in the heart rate and the blood volume
pressure) in response to price ﬂuctuations, and that these emotional responses are related
21See also Kandasamy et al. (2013) who show that exogenously administrating the stress hormone
cortisol increases risk aversion. Furthermore, the results from Knutson et al. (2008) suggest that activity
in the nucleus accumbens (a neuronal marker for positive arousal) mediates the inﬂuence of incidental
positive emotions on subsequent risk taking. See also Apicella et al. (2014) on the role of testosterone
in ﬁnancial risk taking.
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to trading performance (Lo and Repin 2002; Lo et al. 2005).
We therefore examined whether our treatments evoked diﬀerent emotional reactions,
and, in addition, whether emotions are related to investment decisions. Figure 4 visual-
izes treatment diﬀerences in general aﬀect and the speciﬁc emotion of fear. The ﬁgure
reveals that subjects felt generally worse (Panel A) and they also reported a higher level
of fear (Panel B) in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom. To examine the
Figure 4: Booms, busts and emotions
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statistical signiﬁcance of these treatment diﬀerences, we estimated an OLS regression
model in which we separately regressed our two measures of emotions on a dummy for
treatment Bust, and our set of control variables. The estimation results are reported in
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the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3. Column (1) shows that while the treatment variable
Bust is only marginally signiﬁcant in the equation for general aﬀect (p = 0.070, t-test),
the second column shows that treatment Bust caused a highly signiﬁcant increase in fear
(p = 0.023, t-test). This indicates that the priming of ﬁnancial market trends has a
causal eﬀect on the speciﬁc emotion of fear.
We also ﬁnd a stronger relationship between investment decisions and fear than with
the general aﬀective state, as columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 indicate. In these columns,
we report OLS regressions in the spirit of model (1) in Table 1, with the diﬀerence that
one of our emotion measures replaces the treatment dummy. Column (3) shows that the
coeﬃcient for general aﬀect has the expected positive sign - i.e., a generally more positive
emotional state is associated with larger investments - but the estimate is statistically
insigniﬁcant (p = 0.147, t-test). In contrast, column (4) shows that the relation between
fear and investments is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.017, t-test), indicating that higher levels
of fear predict lower investments in the risky asset. Thus, taken together, we have shown
that the mere priming of ﬁnancial market trends causes signiﬁcant changes in fear and
that higher levels of fear are associated with less risk taking. To study the extent to
which the treatment eﬀect is mediated by fear we also estimated a model where we
simultaneously control for treatment Bust and our measure of fear (column 5 in Table
3). The results of this regression show that fear reduces the share invested in the risky
asset by roughly 2.7 percentage points per “unit of fear” (p = 0.054, t-test) and that the
eﬀect of Bust is reduced relative to regression (1) in Table 1 in which we do not control
for fear. Moving from “no fear at all” to the average level of fear reduces investments
by 4.4 percentage points, which corresponds to 44.5% of the treatment eﬀect. Yet, the
treatment variable is still positive which could mean that fear does not fully mediate the
treatment eﬀect, or that there is measurement error in the fear variable. In our view,
it is likely that there is measurement error in the fear variable because emotions are
notoriously diﬃcult to measure in a precise way. Nevertheless, our measure of fear at
22
least partly explains the eﬀect of the bust treatment.
In order to test whether fear has a causal impact on the willingness to take ﬁnancial
risks, we conducted an additional experiment in which we exogenously induced fear dur-
ing an investment task. In psychology and neuroscience, a reliable and frequently used
method for inducing fear is to expose subjects to the threat of painful electric shocks
(Schmitz and Grillon 2012). In our experiment 41 university students participated in an
investment task in which they could invest between 0 and 24 Swiss francs. The experi-
ment had two parts, each consisting of 42 investment trials (see appendix B for details).
In part 1 the subjects knew that on average the lotteries oﬀered a 40 to 60 percent chance
of winning an equal or greater amount than the investment. The maximum amount a
lottery could return was 24 Swiss francs plus three times the invested amount. Coarse
information about the expected payoﬀ frequencies was given at the end of part 1, where
subjects were told how often they could earn a positive return rate at the various invest-
ment levels. This means that in part 2 subjects were much better informed about the
expected distribution of returns, implying that the ambiguity concerning the probability
of success was substantially reduced. At the end of the experiment two randomly chosen
trials were paid out.
During both parts of this investment task each subject faced randomly ordered blocks
of low and high fear trials, where one block consisted of three investment trials. A high
(low) fear level was implemented by informing subjects that they would receive painful
(painless) electric shocks that would arrive unpredictably during the next three trials.
Before the experiment, we measured individual pain thresholds so that we could ensure
that each subject received both painful and painless shocks. Subjects received written
information on their computer screens at the beginning of each block of three trials about
whether they were in a low or high pain block. In addition, they received a reminder
shock (either low or high) at the beginning of a block in order to ensure that they were
absolutely certain about the treatment condition.
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The results show that in part 1 (part 2) average investment shares decreased by 7
(10) percent from 54.6 (48.4) to 50.8 (43.7) percent when subjects were exposed to a
high level of fear than when they were subject to low fear. Table B2 in the appendix
reports the OLS-regression results. We regressed the investment shares (measured in
percent of CHF 24) on the treatment condition (“Threat of shock”) and a dummy vari-
able “Information” indicating whether the decisions were made in part 2 after coarse
distributional information about payoﬀs was provided. In order to control for the ac-
tual experience of electric shocks, we also included dummies for the experience of either
painful or non-painful electrical stimulation (“Painful shock” and “Non-painful shock”)
shortly before individuals made the decision in a given trial. In addition, we control
for age and gender. The regression results show that the threat of painful shocks sig-
niﬁcantly reduced investments (p < 0.001, t-test). Interestingly, however, it is only the
threat of a random shock, i.e., the expectation of an adverse event, and not the previous
experience of painful shocks that reduces risk taking.
These results highlight that fear per se, even if it is completely unrelated to economic
events, decreases the willingness to take risks. Thus, taken together, the facts (i) that the
priming of a bust causes fear, (ii) that this fear negatively predicts a lower investment
in risky assets, and (iii) that exogenously induced fear directly causes a reduction in
risky investments, lend coherent support to the hypothesis that fear is one of the key
mechanisms behind the changes in risk aversion during a ﬁnancial cycle.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents experimental evidence on countercyclical risk aversion. We primed
ﬁnancial professionals either with the scenario of a ﬁnancial boom or a bust and then
measured their risk aversion using incentivized investment tasks. We show that thinking
of busts, as opposed to booms, substantially reduces risk taking. Because we have
24
perfect control over expectations about probabilities and payoﬀs in the risk task - and
good measures of expectations in the ambiguity task - we can unambiguously attribute
the behavioral change induced by the boom and bust scenarios to a change in risk
preferences. Finally, we ﬁnd evidence that fear is a plausible explanation for why risk
aversion is higher during a bust than a boom. In fact, if we exogenously induce fear
in subjects during an investment task by exposing them to the threat of an aversive
electric shock, we observe a signiﬁcant reduction in risk taking. This suggests that fear
directly causes a lower willingness to take risks even if that fear is completely unrelated to
economic events. Together, these ﬁndings support a critical component of asset pricing
models that assume countercyclical risk aversion in order to ﬁt empirical observations of
aggregate market behavior.
Our evidence further suggests that countercyclical risk aversion might produce feed-
back loops that amplify market trends. For example, a decline in stock prices that ren-
ders investors more fearful, and consequently, more risk averse, could lead to an increased
number of sales which pushes the prices further down. Several factors might exacerbate
this ampliﬁcation mechanism. For example, analogous to a contagious disease, emotions
may rapidly spread within investors’ social networks and amplify emotional responses
to market trends (de Gelder et al. 2004). Moreover, social projection bias - people’s
tendency to project their own emotions onto others - might have a similar reinforcing
eﬀect (Lee and Andrade 2011). We believe that improving our understanding of how
institutional and behavioral factors moderate such an ampliﬁcation mechanism provides
a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Mobile laboratory
This picture shows the mobile laboratory at the ﬁnancial trade fair.
Figure A2: Plastic boxes for the investment task
(a) Ambiguity task (b) Risk task
The pictures show the plastic boxes ﬁlled with colored balls that were used in the risk and the ambiguity
task to determine whether the good state of the world prevails. At the end of the study, the instructors
fully covered the boxes. Then one of the instructors (who could not see inside the box) randomly picked
a ball.
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Figure A3: The role of market experience in the presence of uncertainty
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This ﬁgure displays the impact of booms and busts on average investments made in the ambiguity task
as a function of the level of ﬁnancial literacy (Panel A) and trading frequency (Panel B). Error bars
indicate standard errors of the mean.
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Table A1: Summary statistics and randomization check
Variable Total sample Boom Bust p-value
(N = 162) (N = 85) (N = 77)
Age 36.395 36.447 36.338 0.971
(10.232) (11.274) (9.015)
Male 0.753 0.812 0.688 0.069
(0.433) (0.393) (0.466)
Monthly 11’041.267 10’576.429 11’560.000 0.977
income (13’899.983) (10’582.771) (16’920.469)
Wealth 0.541 0.566 0.514 0.508
(> CHF 100’000) (0.500) (0.499) (0.503)
Financial 2.673 2.729 2.610 0.536
literacy (0.918) (0.793) (1.041)
High trading 0.519 0.541 0.494 0.544
frequency (0.501) (0.501) (0.503)
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in the total sample and in treatments
Boom and Bust. The last column displays p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization
(X2 tests in case of binary variables and Mann-Whitney tests in case of interval variables). “Age” is
the individual’s age in years. “Male”, “Wealth”, and “High trading frequency” are dummy variables
indicating male subjects, asset ownership of 100’000 Swiss francs or more, and asset trading at a
monthly or more frequent rate. “Monthly income” is the monthly income in Swiss francs. “Financial
literacy” is the ﬁnancial literacy test score, ranging from 0 to 4. Due to item non-response for the
income and the wealth question, sixteen observations are missing for monthly income, and ﬁve for
wealth.
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B Fear Induction Experiment
The purpose of the additional experiment was to measure the causal impact of fear
on ﬁnancial risk taking. 41 university students participated in the experiment. We
induced diﬀerent levels of fear by informing subjects that they would receive both mild
(i.e., painless) and strong (i.e., painful) electric shocks (see Schmitz and Grillon 2012).
Electrical stimulation was applied to the dorsum of the left hand in order to deliver a
maximally focused and centered tactile stimulus. Prior to the experiment, we determined
each subject’s pain threshold using standard procedures (Brooks et al. 2010). Once
individual stimulation thresholds were identiﬁed the experiment started.
The computerized experiment consisted of 84 investment trials, divided into blocks
of three trials. In each block, subjects continuously expected to receive mild (strong)
electric shocks that were administered at random points in time during the block. The
experimental condition (i.e., threat of mild or strong shocks) was announced prior to a
block in three ways: (1) via a text cue on the computer screen indicating “strong” for
the threat-of-shock condition, and “mild” for the control condition, (2) via a reminder
shock that reﬂected the exact intensity of the shock(s) that could occur throughout
the block, and (3) via a speciﬁc background color on the screen that was maintained
during the block and that was consistently associated with either mild or strong shocks
(the color was counterbalanced across subjects). Thus, before each block subjects knew
exactly whether they would receive mild or strong electric shocks. The frequency and
time points of electric shocks were determined stochastically, and thus were completely
unpredictable to subjects. This strengthened the fear manipulation (see Schmitz and
Grillon 2012). Subjects knew that they could neither inﬂuence the frequency nor the
timing of the electric shocks. The length of each trial was ﬁxed at exactly 5.5 seconds,
meaning that subjects could not avoid painful shocks by making faster decisions. We
explained this in detail to the subjects in written and in oral instructions.
In each trial, subjects could invest between 0 and 24 Swiss francs in a lottery. They
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could choose among ﬁve options: invest nothing (i.e., 0 Swiss francs), invest all (i.e.,
24 Swiss francs), or invest one out of three intermediate amounts. The part of the en-
dowment that was not invested was put on a safe account with a zero interest rate.
Intermediate amounts varied stochastically from trial to trial in order to keep subjects
focused on the task. In each trial, the intermediate amounts were randomly and indepen-
dently drawn from three categories (low, medium, high), i.e., one amount was selected
from each category. The low category consisted of the amounts 4, 6, and 8 Swiss francs,
the medium category included the amounts 10, 12, and 14 Swiss francs, and the high
category consisted of the amounts 16, 18, and 20 Swiss francs. So, for example, in a
given trial a subject might have been facing the following ﬁve options: 0, 4, 10, 20, or
24 Swiss francs.
The lotteries returned any integer payoﬀ between 0 Swiss francs and three times the
invested amount plus 24 Swiss francs. Subjects were presented a table illustrating the
minimum and maximum lottery payoﬀ for each possible investment level (see Table B1).
Table B1: Lottery payoﬀ table
If you invest ... the lottery returns a payoﬀ
in the range of ...
0 0
4 0 - 36
6 0 - 42
8 0 - 48
10 0 - 54
12 0 - 60
14 0 - 66
16 0 - 72
18 0 - 78
20 0 - 84
24 0 - 96
The experiment was split into two parts (i.e., 42 trials each) which diﬀered in the
extent of ambiguity of the lotteries. In the ﬁrst part of the experiment (the ﬁrst 42 trials),
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subjects only knew that they had an ambiguous 40 to 60 percent chance to receive at
least the amount invested. In addition, they knew the minimum and maximum payoﬀs
for any feasible investment level (see Table B1). At the end of the ﬁrst part, subjects
were informed how often they chose a positive investment level in the previous 42 rounds.
In addition, the degree of ambiguity was reduced by giving subjects the following coarse
information on the payoﬀ distributions for positive investment levels:
(1) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.54) of a
payoﬀ that is lower than their investment;
(2) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.35) of a
payoﬀ that is zero;
(3) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.33) of a
payoﬀ that is larger than their investment;
(4) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.16) of a
payoﬀ that is larger than 1.5  investment.
This information was presented to the subjects both numerically and with bar charts
at the end of the ﬁrst part. After they received this information, they faced another 42
trials (second part). Recall that the information given at the end of part 1 lowered the
overall investment level but did not aﬀect the impact of fear on investment levels. The
impact remained constant across part 1 and part 2. Thus, the additional information
did not have an impact on the fear eﬀect.
To identify the impact of the threat-of-shock treatment on investment decisions, we
estimated the following regression model using OLS:22
yit = 0 + 1Threatit + 2PSit + 3NPSit + 4Iit + 5Xi + it; (2)
22The results remain the same if we use a Tobit model instead.
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where the dependent variable is the share invested (in percent of the endowment) into
a lottery by individual i in trial t. Threatit is a dummy for the threat-of-shock treatment,
i.e., the condition we implemented to induce fear. Iit is a dummy for decisions made
in the second part, i.e., after providing coarse information about the expected payoﬀ
frequencies. PSit and NPSit are dummy variables for the actual experience of either
painful or non-painful electrical stimulation within an interval of 4 seconds prior to the
display of the choice scenario and until subjects made a choice. We examined shorter
and longer intervals ranging from 2 to 10 seconds; the results remain unchanged. Xi is
a vector that controls for age and gender. Standard errors are corrected for clustering
at the individual level. The estimation results are reported in Table B2 and indicate
that the threat of painful shocks signiﬁcantly reduced investments (p < 0.001, t-test).
Interestingly, it is only the threat of random shocks that aﬀects risk taking because the
actual experience of electric shocks had no impact on subsequent behavior (PS: p = 0.754
and NPS: p = 0.972, t-tests). Finally, revealing coarse information about the expected
payoﬀ frequencies decreased investments (p < 0.001, t-test), but column (2) shows that
the interaction term between the treatment and information dummy is insigniﬁcant (p
= 0.482, t-test), which means that the fear-of-pain eﬀect does not depend on the degree
of ambiguity.
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Table B2: Regression analysis of fear induction experiment
Dependent variable: Share invested in risky asset
(1) (2)
Threat of shock -4.273*** -3.794***
(1.234) (1.189)
Information -6.353*** -5.869**
(2.459) (2.567)
Threat of shock  Information -0.967
(1.376)
Painful shock 0.577 0.584
(1.843) (1.841)
Non-painful shock 0.061 -0.048
(1.762) (1.763)
Age 1.720 1.720
(1.382) (1.382)
Male 4.628 4.628
(6.540) (6.540)
Constant 14.319 14.077
(29.118) (29.041)
N 3399 3399
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the
individual level in parentheses). The dependent variable in both columns is the share invested in a
lottery (in percent of the endowment). “Threat of shock” is a dummy for the painful treat-of-shock
treatment, i.e., the condition we implemented to induce fear by exposing subjects to the threat of
unpredictable, randomly administered painful electric shocks. “Information” is a dummy for decisions
made in the second part of the experiment, i.e., after subjects received coarse information about the
expected payoﬀ frequencies. “Painful shock” and “Non-painful shock” are dummy variables for the actual
experience of either painful or non-painful electrical stimulation within an interval of 4 seconds prior to
the display of the choice scenario and until subjects made a choice. “Age” is a subject’s age in years,
and “Male” is a gender dummy. The number of observations is less than the total number of choice
scenarios (3444) because some subjects did not respond within the allotted 5.5 second time limit and
one subject ended the experiment early. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001.
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